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Executive Summary
• The Trans-Pacific Partnership offers more than just a set of market access opportunities for Australia.  
It also promises ‘systemic change’ in the Asia-Pacific trade architecture.
• The spread of bilateral FTAs in the last decade has caused fractures in the regional trade system, known as 
the ‘noodle bowl problem’. 
• The TPP may help resolve this problem by ‘multilateralising’ existing agreements under one umbrella.  
Its size, ambitious reform agenda and status as a ‘living agreement’ make it especially suited to this task.
• Australia stands to gain considerably if the TPP’s high-standard and multilateral approach becomes a template for 
trade liberalisation in the region
• Businesses and policymakers should be aware of these systemic implications when evaluating participation 
in the TPP 
Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is one of the most significant developments on the trade and foreign policy agendas 
in the Asia-Pacific today. It is huge agreement, comprising twelve member states that collectively account for one-third of 
global economic activity. Its scope is extensive, combining a wide array of tariff reductions with commitments in 24 ‘new’ 
trade policy areas, such as services, intellectual property and e-commerce. In a region that has recently been dominated 
by proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), its multilateral approach to trade liberalisation is also a novel 
development. It has also been implicated in geopolitical rivalries in Asia, particularly the emerging rivalry between the US 
and China for regional leadership.
Since negotiations were completed in October 2015, a series of lively policy debates have attempted to weigh the merits of 
the TPP. In Australia, these debates have mostly focussed on the benefits and costs for the country itself. Some have looked 
at the extent of market access gains, questioning to what extent Australian businesses can benefit from lowered tariffs on 
certain exports. Another has focussed on its Investor-State Dispute Settlement provisions, and whether these impact on the 
Australian government’s ability to engage in certain regulatory behaviours. Others have explored the implications of rules for 
copyright and pharmaceutical patents for the Australian public and businesses. 
While important, these Australian policy debates have tended to overlook another, more systemic, question: What effects will 
the TPP have on the trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific? This is significant, as the TPP promises to be a game-changer for 
how regional trade is organised. Since the turn of the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific has been moving towards a fragmented 
system in which liberalisation was primarily advanced through bilateral agreement-making. This has posed a number of 
challenges – collectively known as the ‘noodle bowl problem’ – which threaten the integrity of the regional system as a whole. 
As the first large, multi-member agreement in several years, the TPP is an important step towards ‘multilateralising’ trade 
policy in the Asia-Pacific.
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Assessing the TPP’s implications for Australia requires more than just weighing its market access benefits against the 
cost of domestic policy reforms. It also requires asking questions regarding the trade architecture exists in the region, and 
the type of system that would best suit Australia’s interests. This paper helps unpack these systemic questions. It explores 
the recent shift to trade bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, the prospects for the TPP to multilateralise the noodle bowl of 
Asian FTAs, and the implications this will carry for Australian policymakers and businesses.
Table 1: Key features of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement
First formally mooted December 2009
Negotiations commence March 2010
Completion Negotiations complete October 2015, text signed February 2016
Ratification process Enters into force 60 days after final member state ratifies; or two years after signing 
if six members (at least 85% of GDP of the TPP area) have ratified
Scope and coverage ‘WTO Plus’ approach: Market access (i.e. tariff reduction) commitments, 
alongside 24 additional trade-related measures
Member states Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, Vietnam
Total GDP of members USD 28 trillion (36.3% of global economy)
Total two-way trade of members USD 9.5 trillion (25.2% of world trade)
Intra-regional trade in TPP area USD 4.1 trillion (42.7% of members’ total trade)
Existing FTAs in TPP area Nineteen bilateral FTAs; one minilateral FTA (NAFTA)
Significant absent members Korea, Indonesia, China
Source: Author’s summary and calculations, from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), Trans-Pacific Partnership Chapter 
Summaries (http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/summaries/Pages/summaries.aspx) and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTADStat Database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/).
The fragmented trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific
In recent years, the structure of the Asia-Pacific trade system has been rapidly transformed. Regional economies have 
for many years been very open to trade, with the East Asian economic miracle of the post-war period driven by the export 
powerhouses of Japan, Korea, the Asian tigers and more recently China. For most of this period, governments had been 
committed multilateralists when it came to trade policy. Liberalisation was primarily advanced as part of global-level 
trade reforms, negotiated and enforced through the GATT/World Trade Organisation. Regional trade initiatives were also 
multilateral in style, such as APEC’s ‘open regionalism’ approach to liberalisation, and the landmark Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA of 1992. 
However, around the year 2000 Asia-Pacific governments began to gradually change their trade policy strategies. 
Bilateral FTAs – agreements which go beyond WTO rules, and preferentially lower trade barriers between two countries – 
increasingly came into favour. In the year 2000, the Asia-Pacific1 was home to only four bilateral FTAs. But as exploratory 
moves soon turned into a rush, the number of bilaterals in the region grew rapidly. By the end of 2015, 48 bilateral 
FTAs had been negotiated between Asia-Pacific governments, and a further 44 were signed with parties outside the 
region. As Table 1 demonstrates, the Asia-Pacific has gone from being a laggard to become the global epicentre of FTA 
negotiation. These agreements dramatically overhauled the architecture of the regional trade system, from one based on 
multilateralism to one characterised by the dominance of bilateral agreement-making.
Several motives underlay the regional shift to trade bilateralism.2 Some governments had become frustrated at a lack of 
progress in the WTO’s Doha round of negotiations and used these agreements as a second-best liberalisation strategy. 
Developed-country governments often used them to advance liberalisation in the so-called WTO-Plus areas (such as 
investment, services and intellectual property), where existing global trade rules are poorly-developed. Others were forced 
to defensively begin signing bilaterals in order to avoid becoming ‘outsiders’ to the ever-expanding web of agreements 
spreading across the region. And for a handful of governments, particularly the US and China, they were used for 
geopolitical purposes: signalling diplomatic intentions, or as a side-payment in alliance relationships.
1 Here, the Asia-Pacific is defined as the 21 member economies of the APEC group.
2 For a summary of the motives behind FTA proliferation in Asia, see Jeffrey D. Wilson (2012). ‘Resource security: A new motivation for 
free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region’. The Pacific Review, 25(4): 429-453.
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The proliferation of bilateral FTAs has led to a phenomenon trade economists call the ‘noodle bowl problem’3. Rather than 
having a single integrated system, the Asia-Pacific is now fragmented and criss-crossed by dozens of individual bilateral 
deals. Compounding matters, these FTAs vary widely in their content. Each includes (and excludes) different sectors, 
and imposes different commitments in terms of tariff reduction. They also vary in terms of how WTO-Plus issues are 
handled, with each implementing issues such as investment protection, intellectual property, and e-commerce differently. 
The result is a patchwork of overlapping and incommensurate FTAs, which metaphorically resembles a tangled bowl of 
noodles. Rather than having a single set of rules applied equally to all, the Asia-Pacific now has 48 different sets of trade 
rules, with major asymmetries in their obligations and standards.
The noodle bowl is widely considered to be bad for trade liberalisation. From the perspective of governments, it 
undermines the cohesiveness of trade rules. Governments must negotiate and monitor a complex set of bilateral 
agreements, straining the capacity of trade bureaucracies. Markets become distorted by trade diversion effects, 
where economies can gain (and lose) export markets due to the marginal effects of FTAs rather than the underlying 
competitiveness of industries. Small economies are at a particular disadvantage, as they lack the clout to press for 
meaningful outcomes when negotiating with large economies on their own. This can also introduce asymmetries, when 
large countries are able to demand greater concessions from smaller players than they must offer in return.
Businesses are equally affected by the noodle bowl problem. It imposes transaction costs on firms, who must ensure 
compliance with literally dozens of different rules based on their key export and import markets. These costs are 
especially prohibitive for SMEs, which often lack the capacity to secure complex commercial advice. It also inhibits the 
development of regional production networks. For example, the automobile industry in Asia draws on technical services, 
raw materials and parts suppliers from a wide range of countries to enable the final production of vehicles. With each link 
in the value chain potentially subject to different trade rules, the costs imposed on can be massive. The inconsistencies 
between different FTAs thus become a new trade barrier themselves.
Trade economists have long understood that the noodle bowl is a major challenge facing economic integration in the Asia-
Pacific. As bilateral agreements proliferated during the mid-2000s, it seemed there was little that could be done about 
it. However, in more recent years many policymakers have not only become aware of the problem, but have also begun to 
devise strategies to rectify it by somehow multilateralising the existing agreements. The TPP is the first, and thus far most 
successful, attempt to do so.
3 This problem was initially labelled the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem by Jagdish Bhagwati (1995). The World Trade System At Risk, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Richard Baldwin subsequently styled it the ‘noodle bowl’ when applying the concept to the 
Asia-Pacific. See Richard Baldwin (2007). ‘Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism’, ADB Working Paper 
Series (No. 7), Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
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Multilateralising the Asian noodle bowl
The TPP is an extremely complex agreement. The ‘core’ text of the English language version runs to 864 pages, which 
expands to several thousand when its 112 country-specific annexes are included. When trying to sell the agreement to 
domestic audiences, members states have tended to focus on one of two aspects: either the market access opportunities 
for local exporters, or the benefits offered by its WTO-Plus provisions. 
An important, but often overlooked, feature is that the TPP is an explicit attempt to address the noodle bowl problem. 
By providing a single, overarching set of trade rules with (relatively broad) regional coverage, it is one of the first steps in 
returning Asia-Pacific trade architecture to a multilateral model. Three features make it particularly suited to this task:
The first is its size. The TPP is one of the largest free trade agreements ever signed, and is not only of regional but 
global importance. The combined economic size of the 12-member bloc is USD 28 trillion, equivalent to just over one-third 
of world GDP. They conduct USD 9.5 trillion of two-way trade, approximately for a quarter of world trade flows. Intra-
regional trade within the bloc is already very dense. TPP members engaged in USD 4 trillion of trade with each other in 
2014, accounting for 42% of their two-way trade (Table 1). The presence of global heavyweights such as Japan and the US, 
alongside important emerging economies like Malaysia and Vietnam, gives the group a significant degree of  
geo-economic heft.
This size makes the TPP an ideal candidate for multilateralising the regional noodle bowl. There are currently 19 FTAs 
between its members4, which account for just under half of all the bilateral FTAs in the region. While the TPP does 
not subsume or legally replace these agreements, it does establish a common set of trade rules amongst countries 
in the group. For example, it provides a single investment chapter – which define investment concepts, clearly specify 
protections, and outline dispute settlement mechanisms – consistently across the membership. Articulating a single set 
of trade rules for such a large chunk of the global economy is of broader systemic importance. These rules may provide a 
template around which negotiations in the WTO can be structured.
The second is its WTO-Plus approach to liberalisation. The TPP text reflects ambitions to execute what its members 
describe as a “21st century trade agreement”. Unlike many bilateral FTAs, the agreement goes beyond tariff reduction to 
include series of trade-related policy issues that have yet to be addressed at the WTO. These provisions are summarised 
in Table 1 below. Many are new trade issues – including as e-commerce, telecommunications and services – whose 
importance has increased with the rise of the digital economy and service-sector trade. Others are issues which have 
recently emerged onto the economic policy agenda, such as environment, labour and anti-corruption measures. The TPP 
sets a high water mark for forms of trade liberalisation beyond the mutual reduction of tariffs.
The TPP is a first step in ensuring regulatory coherence in these new trade policy areas. One of the main distortions 
introduced by bilaterals is their inconsistent approach to WTO Plus issues. Many of the region’s existing FTAs have 
ignored these issues, only weakly implemented them, or established clashing and incommensurate regulatory rules5. 
By establishing a common set of rules and definitions for WTO-Plus liberalisation, the TPP can help smooth out these 
inconsistencies. One example is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). Despite featuring in many previous bilaterals, 
differing ISDS implementations have resulted in a lack of clarity over precisely what rights and obligations they impose.6 
A particular concern has been around the definition of ‘expropriation’, and to what extent this impacts on governments’ 
ability to engage in public welfare regulation.7 Providing a single ISDS template can help end this uncertainty for both 
businesses and governments.
The third is its status as a ‘living agreement’. The member states have made clear that the TPP is not a fixed, one-shot 
agreement. Rather, it is intended to be an open framework for ongoing trade policy reform. One mechanism has been the 
active encouragement of new member states. Negotiations initially commenced with only eight members, but Canada, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Japan all joined during talks. Korea and Indonesia are currently discussing accession arrangements, 
while other regional governments will be studying the details closely. If additional new members can be courted to join the 
TPP in coming years, this will help push it towards full regional coverage of the Asia-Pacific. 
An additional mechanism is the scope for expanding and adding new provisions to the text. Since negotiations concluded 
in October 2015, member states have already exchanged 27 ‘side letters’ – bilateral or minilateral agreements which 
refine (and in some cases extend) liberalisation commitments. The TPP also establishes a series of cooperation 
frameworks, charged with studying national policies and suggesting avenues for policy reform. For example, it creates an 
‘TPP Environmental Committee’ tasked with improving inter-governmental policy coordination; alongside institutionalised 
process for consultation on intellectual property and patent issues. These mechanisms mean the TPP is likely to increase 
in size and scope once initial ratification is complete.
4 Author’s compilation, from Asian Development Bank, Asia Regional Integration Centre Free Trade Agreements Database  
(https://aric.adb.org/fta-all).
5 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill (2011). ‘Multilateralising regionalism: What role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?’. 
The Pacific Review, 10(2): 201-245.
6 Marta Latek (2014). Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): State of play and prospects for reform. EPRS Briefing, 130710REV2, 
Brussels: European Parliamentary Briefing Service.
7 For a discussion, see Chapter Four of Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (2014). Report of Inquiry into 
the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Canberra: Department of the Senate.
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Table 2 WTO Plus issues included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Chapter Example provisions
Investment Most-favoured-nation and national treatment protections, enforced via standardised 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) process
Transparency and Anti-
Corruption
Requirement for members to criminalise (and sanction) corruption, and to adopt 
appropriate accounting, auditing and financial disclosure standards 
Environment Requirements for effective enforcement of national environmental law; promotion of 
collaborative activities in range of areas (fisheries, CITES, biodiversity, renewable energy)
E-commerce Privacy protections; equal treatment of digital content; protections for source code
Intellectual Property Protection of trademarks and geographical indicators; harmonisation of patent rules; 
life-plus-70-years standards for copyright; requirements for enforcement regimes
State-owned enterprises Requirement for SOEs to act in accordance with ‘commercial considerations’ in specified 
circumstances; transparency rules for reporting SOEs and government monopolies
Telecommunications Requirement for major suppliers to provide service to foreign firms on a non-
discriminatory basis; transparency regulations
Financial services National treatment, most-favoured-nation and cross-border-supply provisions
Services National treatment, most-favoured-nation and market access provisions
Labour Prohibition against weakening or failure to enforce labour standards; initiatives to 
discourage trade in goods made using forced or child labour
Author’s summary, from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Aust.), Trans-Pacific Partnership Chapter Summaries 
(http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/summaries/Pages/summaries.aspx) 
These aspects mean the TPP is the first meaningful step towards addressing the noodle bowl of Asia-Pacific FTAs. It has 
the potential to induce systemic change, which could start the process of switching the regional trade architecture away 
from bilateralism toward a multilateral structure. In the long term, this feature may prove far more important than the 
short-term market access gains on offer when the agreement initially takes force. 
Can the TPP be a system changer for trade in the Asia-Pacific?
Of course, the potential systemic consequences of the TPP remain just that. The agreement still has to be ratified by 
the member states – the process through which domestic laws are amended to comply with treaty commitments. The 
ratification process itself may prove politically challenging, as opponents of the deal will try to block its implementation in 
domestic law.8 Even then, whether the TPP will provide a foundation for a new Asia-Pacific trade architecture remains an 
open question. A number of obstacles exist that may undermine its ability to multilateralise trade in the region.
The long-term success of the TPP will ultimately hang on whether it can attract new members. Recruitment will prove 
challenging as many of the WTO Plus clauses in the agreement are not entirely appealing to developing countries in the 
region. Service sector and intellectual property provisions will require deeper liberalisation than developing countries have 
hitherto undertaken. Rules for state-owned enterprises will require difficult corporate governance reforms in politically-
sensitive firms. Even though the benefits of accession might be high, the reform costs facing developing countries are high 
as well. Much will depend on governments’ appetite for, and political capacity to push through, challenging policy reforms.
China’s relationship with the TPP is especially fraught. The US government has indicated that the TPP is the ‘economic 
wing’ of its Pivot to Asia strategy9, leading some to suggest it is an attempt to economically balance China’s influence in 
the region.10 In 2015, the US President directly linked the TPP to issues of regional leadership, declaring “If we don’t write 
the rules [through the TPP], China will write the rules out in that region”. While the comment was primarily designed to 
build support amongst domestic constituencies11, it left little doubt the TPP is also implicated in the emerging geopolitical 
rivalry between the US and China. Any Chinese accession will thus face the added complication of managing Sino-US 
relations, presently at historic lows due to maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.
8 For a discussion of domestic impediments to ratification, see The Conversation (2015), ‘Five things you need to know about the  
Trans-Pacific Partnership’, 6 October.
9 Thomas Donilon (2013). ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’ - Remarks to the Asia Society, 11 March,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a 
10 Simon Reich (2015). ‘Is TPP about jobs – or China?’. The Conversation, 23 May; Sean Mirski (2015). ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
China, America and the Balance of Power’, The National Interest, 6 July.
11 Wall Street Journal (2015). ‘Obama Presses Case for Asia Trade Deal, Warns Failure Would Benefit China’, 27 April 2015.
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The TPP also faces competition from another multilateral trade proposal currently under negotiation, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.12 RCEP is also an attempt to multilateralise the Asia-Pacific 
noodle bowl, by combining the six existing ASEAN-Plus-X13 FTAs under a single umbrella. However, and unlike the TPP, 
RCEP has far lower reform ambitions. Its principal goal is to merge existing FTAs together (rather than push trade 
liberalisation further), and negotiations have paid far less attention to WTO Plus issues. It also has an ‘Asian’ rather than 
Asia-Pacific membership: counting China, India and all the ASEAN states as members, but lacking the US and Canada.
The two agreements offer competing visions for how to fix the noodle bowl problem in the region. The TPP embodies 
an ambitious and US-led template which advances beyond the WTO; while RCEP is a lower standard, WTO-consistent 
and ASEAN/China-driven alternative. For this reason, RCEP is an easier option for many developing economies in the 
region as it will not impose the high reform costs required by the TPP. RCEP negotiations are ongoing at time of writing, 
with member states recently committing to complete talks by the end of 2016.14 If this goal is achieved, some countries 
– particularly Indonesia and China – may instead prefer to multilateralise on the lower-standard basis offered by RCEP. 
That could lead to two different regional trade systems emerging, with different standards and different (but overlapping) 
memberships. The task for TPP members would become more complicated in such an environment.
Finally, TPP will not do away any of the FTAs that make up the regional noodle bowl. While the high-standard TPP 
provisions usually exceed those in bilateral FTAs, this is not always the case. One example is Australia’s FTAs with the 
US and Japan, whose investment chapters contain special monetary thresholds for screening by the Foreign Investment 
Review Board. For this reason, all of the nineteen bilaterals between TPP members will need to remain in place. The 
TPP’s main impact is not in eliminating the noodle bowl, but rather moving past it by establishing a new and higher 
set of standards.
The TPP and trade multilateralism: Implications for Australia?
Australia stands to gain considerably if the TPP is able to induce a multilateralisation of the Asia-Pacific trade 
architecture. In the regional context, Australia is not only a very open economy, but also a very small one. Countries like 
Australia – which lack the size or political heft to negotiate strong bilateral agreements on their own – generally benefit 
from multilateral liberalisation the most. But with the mandate behind the WTO’s Doha Round recently collapsing15, a new 
global-level trade agreement looks unlikely for the foreseeable future. In this context, multilateralism at the regional level 
is a second-best option. The fact that the TPP has delivered much greater outcomes than Australia’s previous bilaterals16 
attests to the benefits that a regional approach can offer.
The WTO Plus approach embodied in the TPP is also a natural fit with Australia’s trade policy interests. Many of its 
provisions, especially those to do with agriculture and services, are directly relevant to areas in which the Australian 
economy has a comparative advantage. But these have hitherto been ignored at the WTO, and Australia’s record of 
achieving meaningful outcomes in its bilaterals has been patchy at best. The much-vaunted China–Australia FTA provides 
an instructive example, where a series of compromises necessary to finish negotiations saw many of Australia’s core 
requests ‘carved-out’ of the final text.17 The TPP provides an opportunity to advance the type of liberalisation that Australia 
wants, with some of its most important trade partners.
Geopolitical considerations are an inevitable complicator. Due to issues of US–China rivalry, membership of the TPP 
– unfortunately, but unavoidably – involves Australia signalling its diplomatic allegiances in Asia. With geopolitical 
alignments in the Asia-Pacific becoming increasingly complex and contested, this needs to be managed. The fact that 
Australia is an active participant in RCEP negotiations is important here, as it avoids perceptions of taking sides. The 
China–Australia FTA similarly provides a hedge against allegations has politicised its trade policy, and/or is participating in 
a US-led attempt to exclude China from regional agreements. Taking a leadership role in the newly-formed (and China-
sponsored) Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would also send the message that Australia is ‘open for business’ with 
all partners in the region.
Perhaps most importantly, Australian actors must recognise that the TPP is more than ‘just another FTA’ to add to the Asia-
Pacific noodle bowl. Its ultimate promise lies in its ability to induce a systemic change in the regional trade architecture itself, 
away from bilateralism and towards a multilateral model that better suits Australia’s trade interests. In the long-run, this 
systemic effect will be of far greater significance than the market access opportunities on offer when the agreement initially 
takes force. Australian policymakers need to think creatively about what kind of trade system the country wants, and not 
simply what concessions can be easily achieved, when engaging with TPP members to grow the living agreement.
12 For a comparison of the TPP and RCEP, see Jeffrey D. Wilson (2015). ‘Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing 
Between the TPP and RCEP?’. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 45(2): 345-353.
13 The ASEAN bloc presently has bilateral FTAs with Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.
14 RCEP Countries (2015). RCEP Leaders’ Joint Statement on the RCEP Negotiations, 22 November.  
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/news/Pages/rcep-leaders-joint-statement-on-the-rcep-negotiations-22-november-2015-
kuala-lumpur-malaysia.aspx 
15 Financial Times (2015). ‘Trade talks lead to ‘death of Doha and birth of new WTO’, 20 December.
16 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill (2015). ‘Australia’s flawed approach to trade negotiations: and where do we sign?’. Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, 69(5): 496-512.
17 Jeffrey D. Wilson (2015). ‘China-Australia trade agreement a compromised victory’. The Conversation, 18 June.
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